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NOTES AND COMMENTS
that a release of the grantee from personal liability by his grantor
without the mortgagee's consent is a valid defense unless the mort-
gagee has accepted the promise before the release.1 s At least two
states have reached an opposite result upon the reasoning that, as the
promise is beneficial to the mortgagee, his immediate acceptance is
presumed. 19
If the purchaser assumes payment of the mortgage debt, subject
expressly to the defenses available to the vendor, he may attack the
validity of that debt in an action by the mortgagee ;20 however he is
ordinarily estopped from availing himself of this type of defense.
2 1
The theory is that as he has been credited with the value of the
mortgage debt upon the purchase price, it would be unfair to permit
him to deny the legality of either the debt or mortgage.22  It is be-
cause of this reasoning that defenses such as usury,2 3 defective
execution of the mortgage,2 4 lack of consideration for the debt, 28
and fraud in procuring the mortgage, 26 are unavailable to the
purchaser.
EMMETT C. WILLIS, JR.
Negligence-Imputed Negligence-Joint Enterprise-Liability of
Passenger in Automobile for Negligence of Driver.
Plaintiff's intestate offered, purely as an accommodation, to drive
a car, which a dealer was repossessing, from a distant part of the
city back to the dealer's garage. While he was being driven to the
location by an employee of the dealer, he was killed when the car in
which he was riding was wrecked in a collision with a bus, caused
by the concurring negligence of the drivers of both vehicles. Suit
against the bus driver who pleads contributory negligence by imputa-
" Hagnan v. Williams, 228 N. W. 811 (S. D. 1930); cf. Holloway v.
Hendrick, 98 N. J. Eq. 713, 129 AtI. 702 (1925) (distinguishable on the grounds
that here the vendor performed his contract although he did so in such a
manner as to warrant a counterclaim had the action been between him and
the purchaser).
Is Thacker v. Hubbard & Appleby, supra note 6.
21 Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill. 91, 1 N. E. 340 (1884) ; Starbird v. Cranston,
24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652 (1897).
0 Erwin v. Morris, 137 N. C. 48, 49 S. E. 53 (1904).
Caldwell v. Comm. Bank of Waynoka, 80 Okla. 11l., 194 Pac. 898 (1921).
2 Chenoweth v. Nat. Building Ass'n., 59 W. Va. 653, 53 S. E. 559 (1906);
Midland Say. & Loan Co. v. Neighbor, 54 Okla. 626, 154 Pac. 506 (1916).
= Caldwell v. Comm. Bank of Waynoka, supra note 21.
24 Hill v. Longe, 95 Vt. 411, 115 Atl. 237 (1921).
Peoples Trust Co. v. Doolittle, 178 App. Div. 802, 165 N. Y. Supp. 813
(1917).
Curry v. Lafon, 133 Mo. App. 163, 113 S. W. 246 (1908).
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tion from the intestate's driver to the intestate. Held, judgment for
plaintiff affirmed; there was no master and servant or agency rela-
tionship, and while there was a joint enterprise the intestate had no
such control over the car as to impute the driver's negligence to
him.'
This case raises directly the problem of when will the negligence
of a driver of an automobile be imputed to a passenger riding with
him.2 The question arises most often in cases in which the injured
passenger, or his representative, sues the negligent third party who
attempts to defeat recovery on the ground of contributory negli-
gence by imputation as in the instant case. The problem may also
arise where the passenger is the defendant and a third party seeks
to hold him liable for the negligence of the driver.3 A passenger, of
course, may be guilty of negligence separate and distinct from any
negligence on the part of his driver, and in such case there is no need
to apply the doctrine of imputed negligence.
4
The courts are in general accord that wherever the relationship
of agency, master and servant,5 or joint enterprise can be established
Gilmore v. Grass, 68 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
'The doctrine of imputed negligence may be considered to have originated
in England with the case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115 (C. P. 1849).
It was subsequently repudiated in Mills v. Armstrong (The "Bernina"), 13
A. C. 1, 58 L. T. 425 (1887). It was repudiated by the United States Supreme
Court in Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391, 29 L. ed. 652 (1886),
and is now generally discredited. Ga. Pac. R. Co. v. Hughes, 87 Ala. 610, 6
So. 413 (1889); Colo. & So. R. Co. v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 517, 81 Pac. 801
(1905) ; State v. Boston & M. R. Co., 80 Me. 430, 15 Atl. 36 (1888) ; (1921)
19 MicE. L. REv. 858.
'Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739 (1921) (pedestrian injured
by negligence of son driving father, held son's negligence not imputable to
father). It is sometimes attempted to invoke the doctrine of imputed neg-
ligence in a suit between passenger and driver, but it is held to have no appli-
cation as there is a duty of care owed between joint enterprisers just as there
is between principal and agent, master and servant, or host and guest. Yanco
v. Thon, 108 N. J. L. 235, 157 Atl. 101 (1931); see (1929) 77 U. oF PA. L.
Rm. 676, at 682. See also ToRTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1933) §30.
'Most jurisdictions hold a passenger responsible for exercising reasonable
care for his own safety. For definitions of what constitutes such negligence on
the part of a passenger as will defeat his recovery from the negligent third
party: Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Barranco, 203 Ala. 639, 84 So.
839 (1920) ; Sharp v. Sproat, 111 Kans. 735, 208" Pac. 613 (1922) ; Graham's
Adm'r. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 185 Ky. 370, 215 S. W. 60 (1919) ; Cotton v. Will-
mar & S. F. R Co., 99 Minn. 366, 109 N. W. 835 (1906); Brubaker v. Iowa
County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N. W. 690 (1921) ; Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn.
586, 280 S. W. 32 (1926) (riding with drunken driver, held contributory neg-
ligence). Contra: Tyree v. Tudor, 183 N. C. 340, 111 S. E. 714 (1922) (young
girl killed returning from dance with drunken escort, held not contributorily
negligent: either personally or by imputation, as there was no joint adventure
although she had said "get me home in a hurry").
The servant's negligence while driving the master's car will be imputed to
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the doctrine will be applied. Master and servant relations are rel-
atively easy to prove; agency may present a slightly more difficult
problem; but it is in the determination of joint enterprise that true
confusion exists.6 There has been a total failure on the part of the
courts to lay down any definite tests or definitions by which this last
may be determined.
There are a few general types of relationships that the courts
seem unanimously to hold do not constitute joint enterprise unless
other factors exist. The driver's negligence will not be imputed; to
a mere guest in an automobile who has no particular control over
the driver ;7 to a passenger in a public conveyance ;8 between husband
and wife from the mere fact of their marital relationship ;9 on ac-
the master riding with him. Markowitz v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 186 Mo.
350, 85 S. W. 351 (1904); Schofield v. Director General of Railroads, 276. Pa.
508, 120 Atl. 449 (1923); Hepps v. Bessemer & L. E. R. Co., 284 Pa. 479,
131 Atl. 279 (1925). But if employer is riding in employee's car by choice of
employee, then it will not be imputed. County Com'rs of Dorchester County
v. Wright, 138 Md. 577, 114 Atl. 573 (1921). The master's negligence will
generally be imputed to a servant riding with him. Robertson v. United Fuel
& Supply Co., 218 Mich. 271, 187 N. W. 300 (1922). Contra: Compagna v.
Lyles, 298 Pa. 352, 148 Atl. 527 (1929) ; (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 581. Chauf-
feur's negligence will be imputed to employer but not necessarily to other
members of the employer's family. Bullard v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 226
Mass. 262, 115 N. E. 294 (1917).
'The courts talk about agency, master and servant, and joint enterprise as
three entirely separate and distinct relationships. The reason for this is unex-
plainable, other than by historical development, as all of these are a phase of
agency and rest ultimately on the same fundamental principle, namely, action
for another by representation. *
' Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516, 101 So. 49 (1924) ; Meyers v.
Southern Pac. Co., 63 Cal. App. 164, 218 Pac. 284 (1923); Withey v. Fowler
Co., 164 Iowa 377, 145 N. W. 923 (1914); Pusey v. Att. C. L. R. Co., 181
N. C. 137, 106 S. E. 452 (1921). This is not changed because guest may indi-
cate or direct the way he wants to go. Cram v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa
1292, 172 N. W. 23 (1919). Michigan is the only state which reaches the
opposite result still adhering to the original theory that by electing to ride
with the driver the passenger adopts the driver's acts as his own. Gates v.
Landon, 216 Mich. 417, 185 N. W. 723 (1921) ; Holsaple v. Superintendents
of Poor of Menominee County, 232 Mich. 603, 206 N. W. 529 (1925). But it
is not applied to passengers in private carriers for hire, nor to those paying
for their ride. Lachow v. Kimmich, 263 Mich. 1, 248 N. W. 531 (1933);
Johnson v. Mack, 263 Mich. 10, 248 N. W. 534 (1933). Wisconsin was the
first American state to endorse the doctrine of imputed negligence, and one
of the last to discard it. See Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878)
Reiter v. Grober, sitpra note 3.
6 Little v. Hackett, siupra note 2.
'Withey v. Fowler, supra note 7; Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161
N. W. 715 (1917) ; Brubaker v. Iowa County, supra note 4 (even though both
are travelling together to take up a new residence in a new city, both to enter
separate businesses there) ; cf. Langley v. Southern R. Co., 113 S. C. 45, 101
S. E. 286 (1919) (where wife influenced husband to drive at high speed, his
negligence imputed to her). For collection of cases see Gilmore, Imputed
Negligence (1921) 1 Wis. L. REv. 193, at 203.
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count of family or blood relation in general. 10 Nor will a pleasure
trip alone make a joint enterprise.'
It is more difficult to say when the doctrine will be applied.
Community of interest in the common purpose,1 2 anticipation of
sharing in any profits, mutual ownership of the conveyance, and the
right to direct and control its operation are all factors which must
be weighed. The degree of control which the passenger has, though
not necessarily exercises, is the test most favored by students and
critics on the subject, and the one on which the case is most likely
to turn.138 Ownership in itself implies a certain element of control
even though the actual control may be in the hands of another.14
Sharing expenses will generally be held to create joint enterprise,
though the jury may find otherwise;15 and if the conveyance is
11 Bryant v. Pac. Elec. R. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917) (father and
son); Wessling v. Southern Pac. Co., 116 Cal. App. 455, 3 P. (2d) 25 (1931)
(two brothers) ; Kokesh v. Price, supra note 9 (husband, wife, and children) ;
Lomis v. Abelson, 101 Vt. 459, 144 Atl. 378 (1929) (brother and sister).
Contra: Wiley v. Dobins, 204 Iowa 174, 214 N. W. 529 (1927)., Where the
relationship is that of parent and minor child there is a stronger tendency to
hold that the negligence is imputed. Gallagher v. Johnson, 237 Mass. 455, 130
N. E. 174 (1921), but even in this situation the majority of courts refuse to
impute the negligence. Mullinax v. Hord, 174 N. C. 607, 94 S. E. 426 (1917);
note (1921) 15 A. L. R. 414.
"'Parker v. Ullom, 84 Colo. 433, 271 Pac. 187 (1928) (going to a poker
game is not a joint adventure); Withey v. Fowler, supra note 7; Tyre
v. Tudor, spra note 4; St. L. & San F. R_ Co. v. Bell, 58 Okla. 84, 159 Pac.
336 (1916) ; Swartz v. Johnson, supra note 4. Contra: Wiley v. Dobins, supra
note 10.
(1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 270 ("A 'common purpose' is but an element
of a 'joint enterprise'").
' This is illustrated in the cases where sharing expenses is held to constitute
joint enterprise. In law the splitting of expense on gas and oil may give one
a joint right or control, but practically courtesy, politeness, or personal rela-
tions may readily prevent the passenger from telling host or owner how to
operate his automobile. For review of tests employed, see Rollison, The
"Joint Enterprise" in the Law of Imputed Negligence (1930) 6 Nomn DAME
LAW. 172; notes (1926) 12 VA. L. Rav. 341; (1928) 62 Am. L. REv. 261, at
264 ("It is not so much actual control, nor actual possibility of control that is
the deciding factor, but rather a possibility of control by implication of law.").
14Masterton v. Leonard, 116 Wash. 551, 200 Pac. 320 (1921) ; Tannehill v.
Kans. City C. & S. R. Co., 279 Mo.. 158, 213 S. W. 818 (1919) (joint owner-
ship of automobile, held joint adventure).
'Beaucage v. Mercer, 206 Mass. 492, 92 N. E. 774 (1910); Derrick v.
Salt Lake & 0. R. Co., 50 Utah 573, 168 Pac. 335 (1917); cf. Coleman v.
Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124 Atl. 224 (1924) (sharing expenses does not show
"joint adventure" as a matter of law for it is not inconsistent with the de-
fendant's rights as owner). Joint enterprise is a question of fact to be found
by the jury under proper instructions from the court. The court defines what
facts will constitute joint enterprise, and if the jury find those facts to have
existed the negligence of the driver is imputed as a matter of law according to
the jurisdiction. Crescent Motor Car Co. v. Stone, supra note 7 (Holding valid
a charge to the effect that if the jury found both drivers were acting in a
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rented by several persons, -whether it be for business or social use,
each sharing in the expense of the rental, then all are deemed to
have a mutual right of control and are joint enterprisers. 16
"Joint enterprise," or "joint adventure," is a term that was un-
known at common law. It is a recent American invention, still in
the process of formation, by which the courts are attempting to dis-
tinguish a group of relationships that are too informal and loose to
be accurately described as partnerships, 17 , but which, nevertheless,
bear most of the same incidents.1 8 It is suggested that this asso-
ciation with business and economic profits is perhaps responsible for
the reluctance of the courts to apply it to social relations. 19  For
although a purely social purpose may constitute a joint enterprise, 20
the courts are much more inclined to apply the doctrine if some kind
of business basis can be shown.2 1 In general there must be com-
munity of interest and purpose in the undertaking, and a joint or
equal right to govern and control the conduct of the other and the
agencies employed.
In the principal case the court in refusing to impute the negligence
reached the correct result under the most approved test since the
common purpose, each having right to drive or control, then the jury might
find it was a joint enterprise and negligence would be imputable) ; Meyers v.
So. Pac. Co., supra note 7.
"Christopherson v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 28 N. D. 128, 147 N. W. 791
(1914); Coleman v. Bent, supra note 15; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Dixon, 51
D. L. R. 576 (1920). The fact that the parties take turns driving will not
make a joint adventure. Hollister v. Hines, 150 Minn. 185, 184 N. W. 856
(1921) ; cf. Washington & 0. D. R. Co., v. Zell's Adm'x, 118 Va. 755, 88 S. E.
309 (1916) (Where two friends went together often, the driver's negligence
held imputed.).
N1 ote (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1055.
The term is less definite than partnership. Connellee v. Nees, 266 S. W.
502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). It generally relates to a single transaction though
it may be for a business to extend over a period of years. Finney v. Terrell,
276 S. W. 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Where the parties agree to share in
profits it will be a joint adventure. Houston v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 300
Fed. 354 (E. D. Va. 1924). But participation in profits does not of itself
prove joint adventure. Hill v. Curtis, 154 App. Div. 662, 139 N. Y. Supp.
428, 430 (1913). Where there is no agreement to share in profits there can be
no joint adventure. Columbian Laundry v. Hencken, 203 App. Div. 140, 196
N. Y. Supp. 523 (1922).
Coleman v. Bent, sapra note 15.
Beaucage v. Mercer, supra note 15.
"Even though a business relationship exists, the element of control may
still be necessary. Wren v. Suburban Motor Transfer Co., 241 S. W. 464
(Mo. App. 1922) (Passenger in real estate agent's car going to inspect house
had no such control over driver as to impute negligence.). It should be
remembered that joint enterprise springs from a contractual relation, and must
eventually rest on contract. The contract does not have to be express; it may
be implied. In re Taub, 4 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924).
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intestate had no control over the driver, even though it varied the
conventional definition by saying, in absence of such control, that




A citizen of Kentucky, beneficiary under a $15,000 accident in-
surance policy, brought suit in the state courts against the insurer, a
non-resident company. To avail itself of the fact that the Federal
courts would enforce the provision of the policy requiring suit to be
brought within two years from the expiration of the time within
which proofs of loss were to be made whereas the Kentucky courts
would not, defendant removed the case to the Federal District Court.
Plaintiff took a non-suit without prejudice and brought a new suit in
the state courts but limited his prayer for relief to $2,999.99. De-
fendant again removed the cause and plaintiff, after his motion to
remand was overruled, allowed a judgment by default in favor of
defendant. Plaintiff appealed, and the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the prayer for relief determined the amount involved for juris-
dictional purposes, and since it was less than $3,000, the motion to
remand should have been granted.1
For reasons similar to those motivating the plaintiff in the prin-
cipal case there are frequent resorts to devices either to confer 2 juris-
diction on the Federal courts or to prevent its attaching.2 It is gen-
erally deducible from the decisions that the device will be approved
provided it is bona fide and some substantial right is in fact relin-
quished. Since the principal case involves a liquidated claim, it
presents, it seems, merely a more obvious variation of the generally
sanctioned limitation of unliquidated claims. 4 But since the amount
'Brady v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 68 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A.
6th, 1933); see also Brown et a! v. House, 20 F. (2d) 142 (S. D. Idaho,
1927) ; Woods v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., 34 F. (2d) 501 (E. D. Ky.
1929); Henderson el al v. Maryland Casualty Co., 62 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932) ; cf. Smith v. Traveller's Protective Ass'n., 200 N. C. 740, 158 S. E.
402 (1931).
2 Williamson v. Oeenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 58 L. ed. 758
(1914); Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and White Taxicab Co., 276
U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. ed. 681 (1929) ; note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV.
320; note (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 311.
' Richardson v. Southern Idaho Waterpower Co., 209 Fed. 949 (D. Idaho
1913) ; Kraus v. Chicago B. and Q. R. R., 16 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
'Swann v. Mutual Res. Fund Life Ass'n, 116 Fed. 232 (W. D. Ky. 1902) ;
Barber v. Boston and Maine R. Co., 145 Fed. 52 (D. Vt. 1906); Harley v.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 471 (W. D. Wash. 1913).
